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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
ARNOLD SIEVERTS, JOHN SIEV1
ERTS, ALBERT SIEVERTS, JAMES. )
SIEVERTS and ABRAHAM SIEVERTS, JR., a co-partnership doing
business as INLAND DEVELOP~fENT COMPANY,
' Case No. 7889
and Appella11tJ, )'

Plai:::ff•

DONALD M. WHITE and LA VINE
H. WHITE, Husband and Wife,
Defendants and Respondents.

Brief of Plaintiffs and Appellants

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiffs brought into this action ·to obtain specific
performance of a Uniform Real Estate Contract entered into
with both of the defendants. The Trial Court failed to
make Findings on some vital issues of fact and it misapplied
the law to the facts of the case. Plaintiffs appeal from the order
denying specific performance.
3
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The Trial Court required plaintiffs' complaint to be somewhat specific. As amended it alleged that on or about June 7,
1950, defendants, as sellers, entered into a written contract
with plaintiffs, as buyers, to convey certain real estate in Salt
Lake County for the sum of $18,000.00 (R. 32). The contract
provided that $7,000.00 was the down payment, and that the
balance up to $15,000.00 was to be paid on or before December
15, 1950, and the balance of $3,000.00 was to be paid oo or
before June 7, 1951 (R. 2). The complaint alleged that the
down payment of $7,000.00 was made at the time of the
execution of the contract, and also alleged that the contract
provided that defendants would furnish plaintiffs with an
abstract of title showing marketable title in defendants, and
that defendants assured plaintiffs that the abstract of title would
be available for examination prior to the time the balance of
the purchase price became available (R. 32). The complaint
then alleged:
"3 That on or about December 15, 1950, the parties
orally agreed that the balance of the purchase price
should be payable in monthly installments of $1,000.00
or more per month until payment in full of the unpaid
balance of the purchase price.

··4 That pursuant to said oral agreement the plaintiffs
paid to defendants the sum of $2,000.00 on January 7,
1951, the sum of $1,000.00 on February 7, 1951, the
sum of $1,000.00 on February 7, 1951, the sum of
$1,000.00 on or about March 7, 1951, the sum of
$1,000.00 on or about April 7, 1951, and the sum of
$1,000.00 on or about May 7, 1951 and that defendants accept said payments on said contract of purchase,
making a total of $13,000.00 paid on the said contract
of sale and purchase.

4
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"5. That defendants failed and neglected to furnish
to plaintiffs a certified abstract of title or any evidence
of marketability of title to said real estate, or any
statement with respect to whether there was an unpaid
mortgage indebtedness against said real property.

"6. That on or about August 1, 1951, plaintiffs requested defendants to furnish abstract of title continued to date for purposes of examination of title and
to ascertain whether there was any unpaid mortgage
indebtedness against said real property~ but defendants
refused to furnish either an abstract of title or any
other evidence of marketable title, and defendants notified plaintiffs orally that they would not furnish any
abstract of title until or unless plaintiffs first paid the
balance of the purchase price.
"7. That defendants demanded the sum of $5,265.03
as the unpaid balance on or about August 7, 1951, and
plaintiffs on said date tendered said sum of money to
defendants in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, and
plaintiffs requested defendants to execute a warranty
deed in accordance with the terms of said contract and
to furnish evidence of marketable title; but defendants
refused to accept said sum of money or any other sum ·
of money, and defendants refused to execute a warranty
deer of to furnish evidence of marketable title.
"8. That plaintiffs have been willing at all times to
pay the unpaid balance of the purchase price, whatever
the unpaid balance might be computed to be, and
plaintiffs continue to offer to pay the unpaid balance
of the purchase price." (R. 3·2-33}.

The complaint then alleged that plaintiffs were entitled
to recover a reasonable attorneys' fee of $2500.00, plus $7500.00
damages and their costs (R. 34). Plaintiffs prayed for specific
performance, attorneys' fees, costs and damages for failure to
perform as agreed (R. 34).
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Defendants denied any oral modification of the contract
but admitted the payments alleged in Paragraph 4 of the
complaint. It was denied that "said payments were made pur·
suant to an oral agreement," and defendants denied the remaining allegations of the complaint (R. 35).
While defendants denied that plaintiffs had made any
tender, as alleged in their complaint, no suggestion was made
cit her indirectly or by implication that any such tender was
insufficient in form or substance or at all. The importance of
this idea will become increasingly apparent in consideration
of the facts and law in this case.
Defendants alleged in their "counterclaim" the making
of original written contract, and that plaintiffs failed to. perform; they alleged that on July 19, 1951, defendants gave
plaintiffs a written notice that "unless the delinquent payments
are made, together with interest due thereon, within twenty
(20) days from the date thereof, said contract would be cancelled.

* * *''

·'That plaintiffs failed, neglected, and refused to 'perform
in accordance with said contract and in accordance with said
written notice of delinquency."
Defendants then pleaded the giving of a five-day notice
to quit the premises on August 13•, 1951, plaintiffs' failure
to respond to such notice, unlawful detention by plaintiffs and
damages.
Plaintiffs replied, admitting that Abraham Sieverts, Jr..
received a letter on July 21, 1951, which declared that plaintiffs were d~linquent, admitting service of a letter on August

6
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15, 1951, being notice to quit, at the home of Abraham Sieverts,
Jr., denying service of the notice to quit and premises, and
denying unlawful detainer. Plaintiffs alleged further:
"7. Further replying to Paragraph 5 of the counterclaim, plaintiffs allege that defendants declared that
the amount necessary to pay said purchase price in full
on August 7, 1951, was the sum of $5,265.03 and
plaintiffs tendered said amount to defendants and demanded that defendants execute and deliver a deed
of conveyance, and defendants promised to meet with
plaintiffs for said purpose on August 7, 1951, but failed
and neglected to do so; and that defendants willfully
avoided payment of the alleged unpaid balance of the
purchase price, and they are estopped to claim default
on the part of plaintiffs.

"8. Further replying to said paragraph 5 of the
counterclaim, the plaintiffs allege that they relied on
the representations of defendants as to the exact amount
of the unpaid balance of the purchase price, by reason
of the fact that defendants had failed to rurnish plaintiffs with a certified abseract of title or other evidence
of title from which plaintiffs could definitely ascertain
whether or not there were any delinquent taxes or
other charges against the contract balance; and that
defendants having told the plaintiffs that the sum of
$5,265.03 constituted the balance of principal and interest and plaintiffs having tendered said sum, and
defendants never having made any correction of said
representation, defendants were and are estopped to
assert that the tender maed by plaintiffs was insufficient or that plaintiffs failed to tender the balance
timely.

"9. Plaintiffs deny each and every allegation of paragraph 6 of said counterclaim; and they allege that any
notice attempted to be given on or about August 13,
7
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1951, was wrongful and wit ha design to defraud
plaintiffs of their interest in said real estate.·' (R.

39-40).
This, then, was the status of the pleadings when the parties
\vent to trial.
At the trial all sides agreed upon the making of the
0riginal written contract. Mr. McKay M. Loveland, real estate
agent who handled the transactions for plaintiffs, testified
that the only abstract of title ever offered plaintiffs by de·
fendants in connection with this transaction, "Exhibit G," was
in his possession only over night, and that it was not examined
with respect to the condition of the title (R. 47-48). It was
not examined at that time because Mrs. White told Mr. Loveland and Mr. Sieverts that "she owed someone that she bought
one piece of property from, owed the money to them on a real
estate contract, and that she would pay off (R. 48). This is
consistent with the testimony of Sieverts (R. 17}, and it is
not denied either by Mr. or Mrs. White or any other witness

(R. 136, 164).
This abstract does not cover all the property described in
the written real estate contract but is a triangle approximately
88 feet by 105 feet. (See Ex. F., Ex. G). There is some con·
fusion in the testimony with respect to whether there was to
be a title insurance policy or an abstract to the triangle. Plain·
tiffs' evidence showed that Mrs. White had ordered a pre·
liminary report from Security Title Company on this piece of
property on May 26, 1950, but no policy was ever issued by
that company on the property. There is no evidence as to
whether the property is insurable or what the status of the
8
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title is to it. All sides agree that the triange is an impurtant
tract insofar as the use of the balance of the property is con·
cerned. Questioned about the triangle Mrs. White stated that
she had abstracts on all her properties, but Ex. G, which does
not cover all the property described in the contract, was the
only abstract ever delivered to plaintiffs for any purpose (R.
17~ 174). And no title insurance policy on the triangle was
ever tendered to plaintiffs by defendants.
There is general agreement that in the first part of January, 1951, a conversation occurred with respect to the modification of the written contract. The version of Abraham Sieverts, Jr., was that he told lvir. and Mrs. White that they would
have to make different arrangements, and they stated at first
that they could not or did not want to and that there was further discussion to the effect that plaintiffs had $2000.00
available at that time. Abraham Sieverts gave them a check
as they left the office and "I told Don and Lavine White if
they were not" (satisfied), "then do not cash the check, and
we will have to make other arrangements." The· check was
cashed. There is no dispute on that point (R. 106).
The testimony of Mrs. White was that she refused to
make any modification of the original contract and that no
modification was made (R. 167). But there is no dispute concerning the fact that a check for $2000.00, dated January 7,
1951, to defendants' order was cashed by defendants, and that
thereafter monthly Mr. or Mrs. White came into the office of
plaintiffs and picked up checks (parenthetically, not cash or certified checks) in the sum of $1000.00 each, and that these checks
were dated, respectively, February 7th, March 7th, April 7th and

9
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May 7th (R. 126. See also Answer R. 35, par. 4. To the effect
that Mr. or Mrs. White came to plaintiffs' office every month
seeR. 106-107. See also R. 123).

Mr. Loveland testified that between January and July 1,
1951, he had numerous conversations with Mr. and Mrs.
White on the telephone wherein Mrs. White stated that defendants wanted to get one of the $1000.00 per month payments (R. 54-56). Loveland stated that Mr. White told him
in a conversation in his office during this period of time that
"they have been lenient and allowed them this $1000.00 a
month, but even then they were delinquent in making their
payments a few days. * * * He said also that he would like
very much to buy the property back and asked me if I would
ask Mr. Sieverts if he would sell it back to them or just give
them their money back on the deal. * * * " (R. 54) .
The Trial Court made no finding whatsoever with respect
to the question of oral modification or modification by opera·
tion of law of the original written contract.
It is not disputed that a letter in longhand dated July 19,
1951, was sent by defendants to plaintiffs. It stated: Defs.

Ex. 14). ·
'·you will recall that the Inland Development Co.
is now delinquent on the contract dated June 7, 1950
for the purchase of our land at about 34th So. & 28th
E. and this letter is to notify you that unless we re·
ceive all payments and the interest now due under the
contract within 20 days from the date of this letter
we will cancel the contract.
Donald M. White
Lavine H. White."
10
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Nor is it disputed in the evidence that this letter was received by Abraham Sievert, Jr., in the mail on July 21, 1951.
On August 7, 1951, a telephone conversation occurred
between 1-Ir. and Mrs. White an the one hand and Abraham
Sieverts, Nlr. Loveland and Mrs. Christopherson, who works
for 1\lr. Loveland, on the other. Plaintiffs' testimony was that
Mr. Sieverts and Mr. Loveland told Mrs. White that they
needed the abstract brought up to date for examination (R.
56, 58, 108, 121). Mrs. White stated that she did not have
any deed prepared but that she would come in that afternoon,
sign the deed, pick up the check and deliver the abstract (R. 61).
Mr. Loveland testified that at first she did not want to accept
plaintiff's check but she stated that she would accept Loveland's
Inland Realty check and that she would take Loveland's figures
for the balance due (R. 58, 87). Loveland's testimony is absolutely clear that Mrs. White· stated she would come in on the
7th before five o'clock.
Mrs. White stated on the stand that this conversation was
to the effect that she would accept Loveland's computation of
the balance due, and that she wanted a cashier's check. She
denied that she ever agreed to. accept Loveland's check, and
she denied that she stated she would come in that afternoon.
She does not deny that she had no deed prepared or that she
had ever signed a deed containing a description of the property
in the contract. There is no evidence that she ever at any time
tendered a deed to plaintiffs.
It is undisputed that neither of the defendants came into
the office on the day of August 7th. Upon their failure to arrive some few minutes before five o'clock on the afternoon
11
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of the 7th, Mr. Loveland and Mr. Sieverts suggested a letter
to l\{rs. Christopherson, and she prepared a letter addressed
to defendants at their home (R. 103). This letter was mailed
on the 7th, special delivery. It offered a check to defendants'
order in the amount of $5,265.03 without stating the drawer,
drawee, or type of check. (Pls. Ex. D.)
This letter was presented by special delivery to Mr. White
at his residence on the morning of. August 8th. He refused to
accept delivery of the letter (R. 15 3-154). It is obvious that
neither Mr. White nor Mrs. White would know what the
letter contained at that time. Neither of them called by telephone or otherwise at the place of business of plaintiffs or Mr.
Loveland to determine the contents of the letter or to determine any other fact concerning the transaction.
It is significant that Mrs. White testified at her deposition
that when she prepared the notice in July, 1951, she did not
know, and she did not want to know, the amounts paid or the
balance due from plaintiffs (R. 140) .
It is important to make clear to the Court that the fact is,
and the record shows, that when defendants refused delivery on
· August 8, 1951, they had tendered no deed to plaintiffs; they
did not know what was contained in the letter the acceptance
of delivery of which they refused, and did not know whether
there was cash, check, letter of explanation or anything else
in the letter. From that time until the present they have refused
to accept any sum whateve~, whether in cash or check or otherwise, in payment of th~ b~lance due on the contract.
The reason this consideration is important is that despitr

12

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

the fact that there was no indication in the answer in this case
that there was any deficiency in tender, nor had there been
any. indication prior to that time, at the trial defendants were
permitted to offer evidence from the records of the Central
Branch of the Continental Bank to the effect that on August
7 and 8, 1951, the indicated balance of Inland Development
Company was $91.99 ( R. 205) . The ledger card from the bank
indicated that Inland Realty Company had a very active account,
fluctuating widely so far as the balance was concerned (~.
205) . The evidence shows that plaintiffs and Mr. Love~and
had several accounts at the Continental Bank, Central Branch

(R. 212).
The evidence further shows, and it is unimpeached in
any ''"ay, that plaintiffs had cash in their office in a large amount
on both August 7 and 8, 1951 (R. 220, 221, et seq.) Abraham
Sieverts, Jr., testified· that in addition to the account on Inland
Development Company he had authority to draw on the accounts of Luxaire Heating, Sunbeam Heating, a ranch account
and Star Supply. He testified that there were moneys in the
bank which could have been used to cover the check to defendants (R. 219, 220). He further stated that he had a credit
at Central Branch of Continental Bank Company, and that
he was sure the check would have been honored (R. 220-221).
Both in the complaint and at the trial plaintiffs tendered
to defendants the sum of $5265.03, or such other amount as
may be determined by the Court to be the correct balance on
the contract. Defendants have refused the offer but never made
objection to the form or substance of the tender, and have de-
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dined to convey the property. At no time have defendants or
either of them, or any person acting in their behalf, tendered
any deed to plaintiffs whatsoever.

STATEMENT OF POINTS RELIED UPON
POINT NO. I
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO MAKE FINDINGS OF FACT ON RELEVANT AND DETERMIN ATIVJ:
ISSUES.

(a) As to whether there was a modification, oral or by
operation of law, of the original contract.
·
(b) As to whether defendants at any time te11dered a deed
to plaintiffs, and particularly whether a deed was tendered iu
sufficient manner as to place plaintiffs in default.
(c) As to whether defendants at any time objected to tbc
sufficiency in form or substance of plaintiffs' tender. of tbe
balance of the contract.
(d) As to whether defendants willfully avoided payment
by plaintiffs of the unpaid balance of the purchase price.
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POINT NO. II
\\-'HERE THERE IS NO OBJECTION RAISED TO A
TENDER BY CHECK, SUCH A TENDER IS SUFFICIENT.

POINT NO. III
THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT DEFENDANTS WERE ENTITLED TO HAVE THE CONTRACT
CANCELLED INASMUCH AS DEFENDANTS DID NOT
AT ANY TIME TENDER TO PLAINTIFFS A DEED TO
THE PROPERTY OR OTHER PERFORMANCE.

POINT IV
THE CONCLUSIONS OF LAW ARE NOT SUPPORTED BY THE FINDINGS, AND THE DECREE IS NOT
SUPPORTED BY THE FINDINGS OF FACT AND/OR
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW.

ARGUMENT
POINT NO. I
THE COURT ERRED IN.FAILING TO MAKE FINDINGS OF FACT ON RELEVANT AND DETERMINATIVE
ISSUES.
A party is entitled to have the Court make findings of
fact on the relevant and material issues with respect to his
theory of the case.

15
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In the case at bar the Trial Court took particular pains
to require plaintiffs to plead in detail their theory as set out
in the statement of facts in this brief. The plaintiffs did in fact
plead with considerable particularity. Plaintiffs and appellants
desire to point out to the Court in this portion of the argument
that despite the requirement of the Court that pleadings be
detailed, the Findings were equivocal, evasive and in some
instances there were no findings whatsoever. upon the issues.
The sub-headings on this point are the issues on which the
Court either made no findings or inadequate findings.

(a) As to whether there was a modification) oral or by
operation of law, of the original contract.
The third amended complaint alleged:
"3. That on or about December 15, 1950, the parties
orally agreed that the balance of the purchase price
should be payable in monthly installments of $1,000.00
or more per month until payment in full of the unpaid
balance of the purchase price." (R. 32-33).
Paragraph 3 of defendants' answer explicitly denied these
allegations (R. 35). The Findings of Fact by the Court may
be searched in vain for any determination of this extremely
important issue. It will be recalled that the testimony of plaintiffs was that there was a conversation early in the month of
January, 1951, .at which time Abraham Sieverts, Jr., speaking
for the plaintiffs, stated that they could not make the payments
due, and that they desired to negotiate other terms. The
last thing said in this conversation was that if defendants
did not desire to accept the proposed modification they should
not cash the check, which was delivered to them. The evi16
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deuce is clear and the fact admitted that defendants did cash the
check and that from January tluough May they continued to
accept monthly checks in the sum of $1000.00.
Certainly, whether or not the contract was orally modified
or whether the acceptance of the $1000.00 payments constituted a waiver within the meaning of the law or relevant issues
of fact and law should be determined by the Court. Failure
to make findings on the question constitutes reversible error.

(b) As to whether defendants at any time tendered a deed
to plaintiffs, and particula,-ly whether a deed was tendered in
sufficient manner as to place plaintiffs in default.
Plaintiffs alleged that defendants failed to furnish to
plaintiffs a certified abstract of title or any evidence of marketable title to the land, or any statement with respect to whether
there was a mortgage against the property. They aUeged further that defendants notified plaintiffs orally that they would
not furnish an abstract of title until or unless plaintiffs first
paid the balance of the purchase price; and it was alleged
further that defendants refused to execute a warranty deed at
the time of plaintiffs' tender. (Plaintiffs' third amended complaint, Paragraphs 6 and 7; R. 33). These allegations were
explicitly denied in the answer (R. 3S) .
Plaintiffs further alleged in their reply:
"plaintiffs allege that defendants declared that the
amount necessary to pay said purchase price in full
on August 7, 1951, was the sum of $5,265.03 and
plaintiffs tendered said amount to defendants and demanded that def~ndants execute a ( nd) deliver a deed
of conveyance, and defendants promised to meet with
17
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plaintiffs for said purpose on August 7, 1951, but
failed and neglected to do so; * * * " (R. 39-40).
As indicated in Point No. III of this brief, whether or
not defendants made a sufficient tender of a deed concurrently
with their demand for plaintiffs' performance goes to the very
heart of this lawsuit. Certainly such issue is a material and relevant question for determination.
Paragraph 10 of the Findings of Fact sets out the defendants' theory that they notified plaintiffs of plaintiffs' delinquency, and in Paragraph 12 the Court found that defendants requested payment "and ~hat upon receipt of payment in
that form they would execute a deed to the property described
in the contract," but the Court failed to make a finding as
to whether there was in fact a tender by defendants of a deed.
Paragraph 12 constitutes an evasion of the issue rather than a
finding upon it.
Paragraph 14 of the Findings alleges in glowing generalities "that on August 7 and August 8, 1951 (defendants) were
ready, willing and able to execute a proper deed to plaintiffs,"·
all of which is equivocation and immaterial. The law requires
a tender.
Here, again, the attempt to circumvent legal requirements
by failing to make findings on material facts is conclusively
apparent. The law requiring a tender at the time of a demand
for performance of a bilateral contract for the sale of real
property is discussed under Point III of this brief.
It is respectfully submitted that the failure of the Trial
Court to make findings on this vital subject constitutes revers-

ible error.
1H .
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(c) As to whether defendants at any time objected to tbe
sufficiency in form or substance of plaintiffs' tender of the
balance of the contract.
The third amended complaint of plaintiffs alleged that
plaintiffs tendered to defendants the sum of $5265.0} on or
about August 7, 1951 (Par. 7; R. 33).
It is denied by the answer (R. 35) and Paragraph 7 of
the reply again alleged the tender of the check, and Paragraph
8 alleged that defendants "never having made any correction
of said representation, defendants were and are estopped to
assert that the tender made by plaintiffs was insufficient or that
plaintiffs failed to tender the balance timely" (R. 40) .
There is absolutely no dispute in the testimony that on
August 7, 1951, despite the fact that defendants had failed to
come into plaintiffs' office as agreed upon the telephone that
day, plaintiffs sent through the mail a letter addressed to defendants, again offering to pay the amount due upon receipt
of a deed, proper abstracts or title insurance. The record is also
clear, and this is extremely important, that when the registered
letter was delivered to defendants' residence on the morning
of August 8, 1951, within the twenty-day period provided by
the notice, the letter was refused. Defendants did not know
at that time the contents of the letter, but the refusal was on
the ground that it was late, and was not upon any other ground.
(See the testimony of Mr. WhiteR. 134).
The importance of a finding as to the basis for the rejection of this letter and the tender contained therein is fully
discussed under Point No. II of this brief. The law is clear
that any objection to a tender must be made at the time thereof.
19
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Defendants cannot sit back and refuse to accept an offer of performance without notifying plaintiffs wherein the performance
is insufficient, and then complain at a later time that the tender
was improperly made.
The Utah statute (Sec. 104-54-10 U.C.A. 1943) requires
that the "person to whom a tender is made must at the time
specify any objection he may have to the money, instrument
or property, or he is deemed to have waived * * * ".
The failure of the Court to make findings on this subject, therefore goes to the core of the dispute. It is, of course,
clear that any finding would have to be made against defendants' position, but that does not avoid the necessity of the
finding on such an important question.

(d) As to whether defendants willfully avoided paymellt
by plaintiffs of the unpaid balance of the purchase price.
Plaintiffs alleged "that defendants willfully avoided payment of the alleged unpaid balance of the purchase price, and
they are estopped to claim default on the part of plaintiffs"
(R. 40). The significance of the allegation is apparent.
From and after August 7, 1951, until the present time
plaintiffs have tendered good and sufficient performance to
defendants. The response from defendants has been equivocation and refusal to comply in any way whatsoever. At the
same time defendants have been so vocal in their complaints
of plaintiffs' alleged non-performance, they have refused
and neglected to perform their own part of the bargain. They
have yet to tender a deed and they have yet to tender an
abstract or title insurance policy for. examination. The evidence
20
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is uncontradicted that the value of the real property was enhanced. It is obvious that the reason defendants refused to
perform was that they hoped to get a better deal from some
other purchaser. Again, the only real reason for failure to
make findings on the issue is that the facts and inferences
were in support of plaintiffs' allegations.

"16. That at the execution of the contract on June
7, 1950 ,the buyers exercised their option to receive such

evidence of title and that an abstract covering approximately 10 acres of the property described in said contract was furnished to the agent of the plaintiffs, one
McKay Loveland, and continued for plaintiffs at the
request of their agent, the said McKay Loveland, and
that a request for a policy of totle insurance on the
remaining land covered by the contract was made by
the said McKay Loveland, as agent for the plaintiffs,
and that the said McaKy Loveland charged the defendants in the closing statement that was submitted
to the defendants at the time of the execution of the
contract for the continuation of the abstract and the
title insurance and that the said McKay Loveland was
paid for both the continuation of the abstract and the
necessary title insurance by the defendants at the time
of the execution of the contract." (R. 238).
This finding is in the light of plaintiffs' allegation:

21

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

"6. That on or about August 1, 1951, plaintiffs. re·
quested defendants to furnish . abstract of title · continued to date for purposes of examination of title and
to ascertain whether there was any unpaid mortgage
indebtedness against said real property; but defendants
refused to furnish either an abstract of title or anr
other evidence of marketable title, and defendants
notifiied plaintiffs orally· that they· would not furnish
any abstract of title until or unless plaintiffs first paid
the balance of the purchase price." (R. 33).
Defendants denied the allegation in Paragraph 5 of their
answer (R. 35). The testimony is uncontradicted that plaintiffs had never been afforded the opportunity of examination
of the only abstract furnished, "Exhibit G," prior to the trial.
This abstract did not cover all the property (R. 196, 197),
and it was in the possession of Mr. Loveland, who is not an
attorney, only over· night in June, 1950, and never at a
later time. It had never been examined by plaintiffs or
for them with a view to a determination of the sufficiency of the title. Evidence concerning the lack of the
title insurance policy on the property not covered by the abstract runs through the entire case.
Of particular interest is the fact that a woman from Mrs.
White's telephone number called Security Title Company and
ordered title insurance in May, 1950, but no insurance was
ever issued on the property (R. 159·162). Certainly there was
no title insurance policy ever presented to plaintiffs for their
examination. The practice is, of course, for such insurance to
be issued in the name of the buyer (R. 202). No one has even
suggested that the defendants have ever obtained such a
policy for any property involved in this case. There is no
evidence in the record, moreover, that either sellers or buyers

2i
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exercised o1n option as to whether an abstract or title insurance
should be furnished on this part of the property.
Yet the Trial Court glosses over this whole problem in
the· face of plaintiffs' direct allegations that they have not
been furnished an abstract, despite repeated requests (Paragraphs 6 and 7 of the third amended complaint; R. 33). The
necessity for defendants' performance of their agreement in
this respect is also treated in Point No. III of this brief. Certainly the Court dearly erred in failing to make any clear,
positive or direct findings of fact on the issue.

POINT NO. II
WHERE THERE IS NO OBJECTION RAISED TO A
TENDER BY CHECK, SUCH A TENDER IS SUFFICIENT.
There is no dispute as to the fact that a communication
dated July 19, 1951, was received by Abraham Sieverts, Jr.,
on July 21, 1951. Said communication was introduced in evidence on defendants' "Exhibit 4." It is a letter in longhand
as follows:
"Salt Lake City, Utah
July 19, 1951
Inland Development Co.,
A Sieverts Jr. 253·3 E 21st So
Salt Lake City Ut
Gentlemen:
You will recall that the Inland Development Co is
now delinquent on the contract dated June 7 1950
for the purchase price of our land at about 34th So
& 28th E. and this letter is to notify you that unless we
23
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receive all payments and the interest now due under
the contract within 20 days from the date of this letter
we will cancel· the contract.
Donald M. White·
Lavine H. White."
The language "within . 20 days from the date of this
letter" means as a matter of law 20 days after the date of
the letter. The day of the letter's writing is excluded. See cases
abstracted at 45 Words and Phrases, p. 382 et seq.
Plaintiffs had to and including August 8, .1951, pursuant
to the provis10ns of this letter, within which to make their
payment. The Court's attention is invited parenthetically to
the fact that defendants did not in this letter tender a deed
pursuant to the contract of June 7, 1951, or any other contract.
There is no indication at any place in the record that defendants tendered a deed to plaintiffs at any time prior to or in
fact after August 7, 1951. Defendants have never tendered
a deed and are not in a position to default plaintiffs when they
have not tendered their own performance. This proposition
is argued elsewhere in this brief.
Plaintiffs' evidence, including the testimony of Mr. McKay
M. Loveland, Mrs. Iris R. Christopherson and Mr. Abraham
Sieverts, Jr., was to the effect that both Mr. and Mrs. \Vhite
stated that they would be in the office of plaintiffs with an
abstract to sign a deed (prepared by plaintiffs at defendants'
request,) on the afternoon of August 7th,. before five
P.M. (R. 58, 87). Neither of defendants came to plaintiffs'
office on that day. Plaintiffs thereupon prepared a letter to
defendants, a copy of which was introduced in evidence as
"Exhibit D." It is as follows:
24
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"August 7, 1951
~ir. and Mrs. Donald M. White
28 3 3 Milereek Road
Salt Lake City, Utah

Dear Mr. and Mrs. White:
We hereby wish to inform you that we have in our
possession to be paid to you a check in the amount of
$5,265.03, which is for payment in full for property
at Salt Lake City, purchased by Inland Development
Company. We have been instructed to surrender check
to you upon your delivering a Warranty Deed for said
property to Inland Development Company.
"If you will please come into our office, you can
sign the Warranty Deed here.
Very truly yours,
INLAND REALTORS, INC.

BY-------------·---------------------.,.
There is attached to this letter a receipt for registered
article No. 487, dated August 7, 1951, post marked as of that
date in the Sugar House Station Post Office at Salt Lake City,
Utah. There is no dispute that this letter was refused by Mr.
Donald M. White at his place of residence on the morning of
August 8, 1951. "Exhibit E," which is the envelope containing
the letter introduced as "Exhibit D" was returned unopened
to plaintiffs.
The Court's attention is invited to the fact that before
this time every single payment made on the contract, after
the original down payment of $7000.00, was made at the
office of plaintiffs at 2263 Highland Drive, Salt Lake City,
by check (R. 106, 107). No deed had been prepared by de25
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fendants, and plaintiffs. had told Mr. Loveland that they would
accept his figures for settlement and he had told them that he
would prepare a deed for their signature.
The record is clear that the registered letter, "Exhibit
D," was refused by defendants on the ground that Mr. White
thought it came one day after the time prescribed by defendants'
notice. ~lrs. White stated in her deposition that she did not
want to know the amount or the balance owed by plaintiffs
when she wrote the amount or the balance owed by plaintiffs
when she wrote her letter of July 19, 1951 (R. 140). Mr.
White testified in his deposition:
"Question, 'Why did you refuse that letter?'
Answer, 'Well, I figured that they were just trying
to pull a fast one by sending a registered letter up there
with a check the day after, when they were told, the
day before, to be up there with the money. I made it
very definite that they were to be at the house with
the money before morning on the 7th. I gave them
till midnight. There was no excuse for them to put the
check in the mail.'
"Question, 'When the letter came, did you look at
the envelope to see whom it was from?'
"Answer, 'NO.'
"Have I read your statement as you gave it to the
reporter at the time your deposition was taken?
"MR. FINLINSON: I think you will find-

A. No.
MR. FINLINSON: -that it was-

Q. Your answer is 'NO'? You have made two
changes in that deposition, have you not?
26
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A. Yes.
Q. As I have now read it to you, you changed the
7th to the 8th?
A. That's right.

Q. You changed the 'No' to 'Yes'?
A. That's right." (R. 154).
The suggestion that the deadline was the 7th rather than
the 8th appears to have been made by counsel between the
time of the deposition and the time of the trial. The record
is as follows on re-direct examination:
··By Mr. Burton:

Q. Mr. White, you ~aid in your deposition, 'I gave
them till midnight.' You prefaced that with the remark , 'I figured they were trying to pull a fast one by
sending the registered letter up there the day after.'
There is no doubt that the letter got there on the 8th,
is there?
A. It·got there the morning of the 8th.

Q. And so that's what you meant when you say it
got there the day after the midnight deadline that you
had given?
A. That's right." (R. 155, 156).
It is thus clear that the reason, and the only reason, the
registered letter was refused was because of the defendants·
belief that the last day to respond to their letter of July 19th
was August 7th rather than August 8th. The question is: When
the tender is refused on this ground, can defendants object
that the tender was made by check rather than by cash?
27
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The Utah Statute and the cases generally·provide a clear
answer. Since no objection was raised to the form or sufficiency
of the tender at the time it was made, and particularly, since
the tender_ has been remade in the pleadin.gs and during the
trial of this cause, defendants are in no position to raise the
ISSUe.

Section 104-54-10 of the Utah Code provides:
"The person to whom a tender is made must, at the
time, specify any objection he may have to the money,
instrument or property, or he is deemed to have waived
it; and, if the objection is to the amount of money, the
terms of the instrument or the amount or kind of property, he must specify the amounts, terms or kind which
he requires, or be precluded from objection afterwards."
This Court held in Hirsh vs. Ogden Furniture & Carpet
Co., 48 Utah, 434, 160 Pac. 283, that this section of the Code
means that where a tender is made by check, the person to
whom it is tendered must specify his objections or he will
be deemed to have waived all objections such as he insists
upon when tender is made. The Court stated further that a
tender , by check by mail is good in the absence of special
objections. The Court stated:
"Under a similar statute the Supreme Court of Cali·
fornia has repeatedly held that where a tender is ma_de
by check the person to whom it is tendered must speofy
his objections or he will be deemed to have waived
all objections except such. as he insists upon when
the tender is made. Lowe v. Yolo, etc., County, 8 Cal.
App. 167, 96 Pac. 379, and cases there cited; Wright
v. John A. Robinson Co., 84 Hun. 172, 32 N. Y.
Supp. 463, Nidever v. Hall, 67 Cal. 79, 7 Pac. 136;
28

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Cleveland v. Toby, 36 11isc. Rep. 319, 73 N. Y. Supp.
544. ~n \V_right v. John A. Robinson Co., supra, the
questiOn ot tender by check by mailing the same, as in
this case, was involved, and it was there held that in
the absence of special objections such a tender is good.
In the case of Cleveland v. Toby, supra, tender was
made by mailing a check as here, and in view that it
was kept good it was held sufficient." ( 160 Pac.
285-6).

The Court stated further at Page 28 7:
"This is but justice as well as common sense. Indeed,
our statute (section 348 7) provides that unless the
person to whom the tender is made objects to the amount
of the tender and specifies the amount he is 'precluded
from objecting afterward.' By this we do not mean to
be understood as holding that. a tender of a nominal
sum in payment of a debt of a larger amount would be
good, and especially not where the person making the
tender knew what the amount due was. That such is
not the intention of the statute is clearly pointed out
by Mr. Chief Justice Beatty in the case of Colton v.
Oakland Bank, 137 Cal. 376, 70 Pac. 225. That the
statute, however, applies with full force in a case like
the one at bar is as dearly held in the cases we have
hereinbefore cited.''
That there were no special objections in this case could
not be more clear upon the record. Both Mr. and Mrs. White
admit that they did not call the plaintiffs or get in touch with
them otherwise by any means of comunication after they
rejected the letter of August 7, 1951 (R. 138).
The Utah rule conforms to the majority of the cases in
jurisdictions both with and without the kind of statute in
effect here.
29
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The editors of 62 Corpus Juris at Page 668 state the
law as follows:
"6. WAIVER OF OBJECTIONS-a. IN GENERAL.
As a general rule objections to the medium in which
tender is made may be waived, and this rule is statutory in some jurisdictions.
"b. BANK NOTES OR OTHER LAWFUL MONEY. Thus, an objection to a tender of bank bills or other
money not legal tender, but which is lawful money,
current and circulating at par, is deemed to be waived,
if at the time the money is offered objection be not
taken that the money is not legal tender. An acceptance
of the tender is a waiver of an objection to the quality
of the money tendered.
"c. CHECKS. A tender of payment by a check is as
effective as a tender of currency if the objection is
expressly waived, or if there be no timely objection
to this form of tender. Thus, if the check is retained, or
returned without objection of any kind, or where it is
refused, not on the ground that it is not legal tendel',
but upon some other ground, as that it is not draw11
for the sum the creditor demands, or that it is not
made in time, the objection to the check is waived and
the tender is good as far as the medium of paymeJtt
is concerned." (Italics ours).
The law is stated in 23 A.L.R., 1288, as follows:
"While, as above shown, a check is not ordinarily
a good medium of tender where objection is raised on
the ground that the tender is by check instead of in
money, yet it is also well settled that this objection
may be waived, and it is generally regarded as waived
unless expressly made at the time. This is especially
true, as appears quite frequently in the cases, where
the creditor bases his refusal to accept the check on
other grounds than the form of the tender. In support
30
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of. th~ proposition that the creditor may waive the
?bJechon .to a tender by check, through failure to obJect on thts ground at the time the tender is made, are
the following cases . . ."
Numerous cases from twenty-six different jurisdictions are
cited in support of the rule. For the convenience of the Court
the following discussion is reprinted here from 23 A.L.R.,
Pages 1289 and 1290:
"The same principle is supported by other cases not
within the scope of the annotation, such as Williams
v. Rorer ( 1842) 7 Mo. 556, to the effect that a tender
made in bank bills is good unless objection is made
to the medium of the tender.
"So, in Neal v. Finley ( 1910) 136 Ky. 346, 124
S. W. 348, the court said generally: 'It is true that
ordinarily a tender of payment in any way than by
legal-tender money is not good. But the parties may
waive that feature of the law. If tender is made in bank
bills, or check, the tender will be deemed sufficient
(provided, in case of check, the drawer has sufficient
funds in the bank to meet the payment), unless the
refusal is based upon the ground that the tender is
not in lawful money.'

"It was said in McGrath v. Gegner ( 1893) 77 Md.
331, 39 Am. St. Rep. 415, 26 Atl. 502, that it was well
settled that where a tender is made by a check on a
bank, and the tender is refused not because of the
character or quality of the tender itself, but on other
grounds, the tender thus made and refused will be considered in law a lawful tender, for the reason that
all objections to the character of the tender will be
considered as having been waived, and for the further
reason that, if objection had been made on the ground
that the tender was not made in lawful money, the
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party would have had the opportunity of obtaining
the money and making a good and valid tender.
·"The tender, even ·of an uncertified check, is sufficient if not objected to at the· time on that ground.
Bunte v. Schumann ( 1905) 46 Misc. 593, 92 N. Y.
Supp. 806.
"The reasons for the doctrine that, if the creditor
bases his refusal to accept the check in payment on
grounds other than the form of the tender, he will
be deemed to have waived this objection, are well
stated in Smith v. Reserve Loan L. Inc. Co. ( 1916)
267 Mo. 342, 184 S. W. 464, where the court, after
citing various cases in support of the rule that a tender
of bank notes, checks, or drafts, or other orders for
the payment of money, if not objected to for failure
to produce legal-tender money, will not be valid because not falling within the description of money made
legal tender ,said: 'The reasoning of these cases is that
the creditor, when offered such representatives of legaltender money, if he is not willing to accept them as
such, should put his refusal on that ground, so that
the debtor may have the opportunity to secure the
specific money which the law prescribes shall be accepted in payment of any debts expressly to be payable
in dollars. Hence, it is deemed only just that the holder
of such an obligation, upon tender of the payment
thereof in bank notes or such things as represent
money in the marts of trade and commerce, shall state
expressly the ground of his rejection in order that
the debtor may comply with the technical law requiring a tender of a particular kind of money. The nonobservance of this duty necessarily misleads the debtor,
any may inflict a loss which would be avoided if the
creditor had stated that he objected to the form and
character of the tender. He should, therefore, be
estopped from subsequently urging an objection which
he suppressed at the time of the offer, if his later
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insistet~Ce thereon would in1lict a loss or damage upon
a ~redttor . (debtor) who, in re_liance on his implied
wruver, faded to produce the kmd of money made a
legal tender by law.'

··In Ricketts v. Buckstaff ( 1902) 64 Neb. 851, 90
1\. \V. 915, where a tender by check was refused on
the ground of the insufficiency of the amount. the
court laid down the rule that, in determining the
sufficiency of a tender which is rejected on specific
grounds, other objections to the tender will not be
considered, but are waived.
"And the rule was considered elementary in Murphy
v. Gold & Stock Teleg. Co. (1889) 24 N.Y. S. R. 123,

3 N. Y. Supp. 804, that one who rejects an offer or
tender upon one or more specific grounds of objection
cannot afterwards raise another which might have been
obviated if it had been made at the proper time.
"In Schaeffer v. Coldren (1912) 237 Pa. 77, 85
Atl. 98, Ann. Cas. 1914B, 175, the court said: 'It is
also objected that the tender of certified checks was
not a valid legal tender within the meaning of the
law. It is true it was not a legal tender in money, but
it has been frequently held that objection to the
medium in which the tender is made may be waived.
If no objection be made on the ground that it is not
lawful money, a certificate of deposit is a sufficient
tender. So, too, if a check be tendered by a debtor who
has sufficient money in bank to pay it, and the creditor
refuses to receive it for some other reason, but not
because it is a check, the tender is valid.'
"In Gundy v. Ingram (1910) 57 Wash. 97, 36
L.R.A. (N.S.) 232, 106 Pac. 495, the court said in
effect that it was well established that a creditor may
\\'aive the character of the money which is tendered, by
raising no objection to the payment on ~he gro~md that
it is not the character of money or specte that IS called
33
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for in the obligation, or by rarsmg some other objection which would exclude the idea of objection on
~hat ground; and that, in view of the fact that probably
90 per cent of business is now transacted through the
medium of checks, drafts, etc., instead of the transfer
of gold and silver coin ,or other species of legal tender,
it would be a dangerous rule, which could easily be
tun1ed into an engine of oppression, that a tender of
payment, especially where it involves the maturing of
obligations not then due, could not be made by check
where no question is raised as to the value of the check
tendered, and especially where, as in the case before
it, was shown that formr payments had been made by
checks, which were not objected to by the creditor."
The following cases in addition support the rule that
the creditor may waive objection to a tender by check through
failure to object on this ground:
CALIFORNIA-Stevens v. Hines ( 1923) 63 Cal. App.
80, 218 Pac. 57.
ILLINOI5-Raginsky v. Lawler ( 1924) }13 Ill. 411,
145 N. E. 189.
IOWA-Murray v. American Sav. Bank ( 1924) 197
Iowa, 318, 197 N. W. 69; Steckel v. Selis (1924)
198 Iowa, 339, 197 N. W. 918.
MASSACHUSETTs-Minsky v. Zieve (reported here·
with) ante, 391.
MICHIGAN .~ Murphy v. Frank P. Miller Corp.
(1924) 229 Mich. 162, 200 N. W. 974.
OKLAHOMA-Rupard v. Rees ( 1923) 94 Okla. 49,
220 Pac. 893; American Oil & Ref. Co. v. Clements ( 1924) 99 Okla. 204, 225 Pac. 349.
OREGON-Hawkins v. Fuller (1925) 116 Or. -U1.
240 Pac. 549.
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TEXA.s-Eureka Producing Co. v. Hoyt (1924)-Tex.
Ctv. App .....• 266 S. W. 203.
\v'EST VIRGINIA-Bickel v. Sheppard ( 1925) 98
\Y/. Va. 305, 127 S. E. 41.
In Sta·ens t-'. Hines, 63 Cal. App. 80, 218 Pac. 57, a check
was "post-dated," the date being subsequent to the tender
but before the obligation was due. The Court held that the ,
tender was good, it having been rejected on other grounds.
The Oklahoma court held in Rupard v. Rees, 94 Okla.,
49, 220 Pac. 89}, that where the objection is not timely made
by the payee on the ground that the tender is by check, so that
the drawer has an opportunity to obtain the money tendered,
the objection will have been waived. The check in this case
was refused on the ground that the creditor had not been
paid all of a previous payment due.
We think as the Utah court stated tn the Hirsh case,
supra, "This is justice as well as common sense." The theory
of the Utah statute is that the person making the tender has
.1 right to know the reason for its objection, so that if he deems
the reason valid, he can protect himself and conform to the
objection.
The reason for the rule is perfectly apparent in the case
at bar where the defendants want to stand upon an unconscionable and inequitable technicality to deprive plaintiffs of
their interest in the land. The rule prescribed by our statute
applies not only to checks but "the terms of the instrument."
It may be that upon reflection an attorney may draw a different
kind of instrument than is "Exhibit D," the letter of August 7,
1951. Perhaps upon further consideration the tender would
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have been made in person or by the sheriff or in cash or in
some other way, but "Exhibit D" cannot be considered outside
the context of its preparation and delivery.
Defendants had already stated that they would be in
plaintiffs' office to sign the deed. They had stated that they
did not have the deed prepared. They had indicated .assent
to Mr. Loveland's computation of the balance. They had not
delivered an abstract for examination upon request. They
had furnished no abstract or title insurance policy upon
the relatively small but important portion of the land involved.
They had never tendered a deed. Under these circumstances,
particularly in view of our statute, is it not unconscionable to
permit defendants to decline to receive a registered letter
containing "Exhibit D," without defendants even knowing the
contents of the letter?
Certainly the holding of the Trial Court in this respect
contravenes the spirit, intention and explicit provisions of the
Utah statute. Certainly the holding is a shocking displ~y of
the lack of "conscience" of a chancellor. It is respectfully
submitted that the Trial Court erred in failing to find that
plaintiffs' tender of performance was sufficient under the
circumstances, and that defendants cannot now complain of
the sufficiency of plaintiffs' offer of performance.

POINT NO. III
THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT DEFENDANTS WERE ENTITLED TO HAVE THE CONTRACT
CANCELLED INASMUCH AS DEFENDANTS DID NOT
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AT ANY Tl!vlE TENDER TO PLAINTIFFS A DEED TO
THE PROPERTY OR OTHER PERFORMANCE.
The evidence is dear that neither at the time of the sending of the letter dated July 19, 1951, nor on August 7th, nor
on August 8th, nor at any other time relevant in this proceeding, did the defendants or either of them tender a deed for
the property described in the contract to plaintiffs. As here-tofore indicated, defendants did indicate to plaintiffs .in a telephone conversation on August. 7th that they would be in to
plaintiffs' office to sign a deed, but there was no deed tendered
with the notice of July 19th, and defendants did not come
into plaintiffs' office or communicate with them in any other
way to tender a deed at or after that date.
The contract in question provides, "The seller on receiving the payments herein reserved to be paid at the times and
in the manner above mentioned, agrees to execute and deliver
to the buyer or assigns, a good and sufficient warranty deed
conveying the title to the above described premises free and
clear of all encumbrances except as herein mentioned, and
except as may have occurred or by or through the acts or
neglect of the buyer, and to furnish at his expense, an abstract
or policy of title insurance, at the option of the seller, brought
to date at time of sale or at time of delivery of deed at the
option of the buyer" (R. 2).
The contract thus provided for concurrent performance
by the buyer and the seller when the last payment by the
buyer became due. The rule is uniformly expressed that under
such circumstances a seller cannot put a buyer in default
without tendering to the buyer a deed in accordance with the
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requirements of the contract. A case closely analogous is
Davis v. C. E. Downie Investment Co., (Sup. Ct. of \Vash.
1934) 38 Pac. (2nd) 215. There a written executory contract
provided for the payments of purchase price of land in installments and for the delivery of a deed to the buyer upon
payment of the last installment. Time was made of the essence
of the contract and it was provided that the contract could be
cancelled and the buyer's rights forfeited in the event of his
default. The last payment became delinquent and there was due
interest and certain taxes which were required to be paid by the
buyer. On May 2, 1932, the seller notified ,the buyer in writing
that unless the amounts due were paid on or before May 12,
1932, the seller "will elect and does hereby elect to declare
a forfeiture and cancellation of said contract and of all your
rights thereunder." May 12th passed, however, without either
party taking any steps to protect his interests and there was
no deed tendered from the seller to the buyer on :May 12th
or at any time prior to August S, 1932, a which time the
seller tendered a deed and demanded payment of the contract.
Nothing was done at that time and the present action was
instituted several days later.
The Court held that the seller having made no tender of
a deed concurrent with or in connection with the notice of
.May 2, 1932, he was in no position to complain that the buyer
was in default. The Court held that since the conditions of
the contract were concurrent, the buyer could not be placed
in default without the seller tendering performance. The
Court stated:
"It is well settled, of course, that under such conditions, when all payments have matured, the t'endor
38
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is under the duty of tendering a deed, or performance
uu bis part, before tbe vendee can be put in default.
Stein v. Waddell, 37 Wash. 634, 80 P. 184;. Brugge·
mann v. Converse, 47 Wash. 581, 92 P. 429; Tacoma
\\'ater Supply Co. v. Dumermuth, 51 Wash. 609, 99
P. 74i; Christy v. Baiocchi, 5} Wash. 644, 102 P.
752; Reese v. Westfield, 56 Wash. 415, 105 P. 837, 28
L.R.A. (N.S.) 956; Gottschalk v. Meisenheimer, 62
\Vash. 299, 113 P. 765, 115 P. 79; Gibson v. Rouse,
81 Wash. 102. 142 P. 464.

"Consequently, it follows that the so-called notice
of forfeiture served on May 2, 1932, without the tender
of a deed by the vendor at the time fixed therein for
the payment, became ineffectual as a notice of forfeiture and ineffectual for any purpose unless acted
upon in some way by one or the other of the parties
to be affected thereby." (Italics ours) .
The Court then held that the subsequent action taken on
August 5, 1932, by the seller was not effective. The Court said
further:
"It would seem, therefore, that the notice of May 2,
1932, was wholly abortive, that the contract was left
in full force and effect, that the vendee might ·thereafter at any time have cured its default by tendering
payment, and that the vendor might thereafter at any
time proceed to put the vendee in default by tendering a deed and demanding the payments which wer~
overdue."
The Supreme Court of the State of Washington held in
C;·im et ux. v. JV atson, et al., 82 Pac. (2d) 172 ( 1938) that:
"The rule simply is that, after final payment is due
upon a time contract for the sale of land, neither party
can put the other in default without tender of perform-
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ance. 2 Warvelle on Vendors (2d ed.), Sees. 756, 816,
841; Stein v. Waddell, 37 Wash, 634, 80 P. 184; Davis
v. Downie Investment Co., 179 Wash. 4 70, 38 Pac.
(2d) 215. In the former case, the statement of the
rule contained in Frink v. Thomas, 20 Or. 265, 25 P.
717, 12 L.R.A. 239, was approved (page 186):
" 'As a general rule, a party who asks for the rescission of a contract for the sale of real estate must be
himself without fault; and when, as in this case, the
payment of the purchase money and the making or
tender of the deed are to occur simultaneously, they
are regarded as mutual and concurrent acts, wbicb
disable either party from putting an end to the contract,
without performance or a valid offer to perform on
his part; and, so far as the question of time is concerned, both parties, after the· day provided for the
consummation, may be considered equally in defa!!lt,
and neither can hold himself dischm·ged from the
obligation of complete performance until be ha.r tendered performance on his own side, and demanded it
on the other.' "
See also Hamlin v. Berry, Sup. Ct. of Wash. 1938, 82
Pac. (2d) 549.
The same rule is applied on Grimes et al. v. Steele et ai.,
Dist. Ct. of App. 3rd Dist. (Cal.), 1943, 133 Pac. (2d) 874.
The Court there stated:
"It is well settled in this state that if a vendor allows the whole of the purchase price to become due
the payment of the price and the tender of a deed then
become dependent and concurrent conditions, and
nonpayment alone does not put the vendee in default.
The vendor must tender a deed as a condition to demanding payment of the price, and he cannot, withm~t
such tender, declare a forfeiture, or maintain a smt
·10

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

either for the whole price, or for an intermediate installment. Kerr v. Reed, 187 Cal. 409, 202 P. 142;
Lemle v. Barry, un Cal. 6, 183 P. 148; Hoppin v.
:Munsey, 185 Cal. 678, 198 P. 398; Boone v. Templeman, supra; Caspar Lumber Co. v. Stowell, 37 Cal. App.
2d 58,98 P. 2d 744; Ross v. McDougal, 31 Cal. App.
2d 114, 87 P. 2d 709; ~lonnette v. Title Guar. & T.
Co., 30 Cal. App. 2d 428, 86 P. 2d 848. The same rule
has been applied where the vendor seeks to quiet title.
Sausalito Bay Land Co. v. Sausalito Imp. Co., 166 Cal.
3<>2, 136 P. 57."
And in Community Industrial Land Co. v. Walker, Dist.
Ct. of Appeals 4th Dist. of Cal. ( 1943), 142 Pac. (2d) 757,
the Court said at Page 759 Pac. Rep.:
"It was held in Boone v. Templeman, 158 Cal. 290,
110 P. 947, 139 Am. St. Rep. 126, that where such a
contract makes the purchase price payable in installments and the deed is to be made when the whole is
paid, and where the vendor allows the full purchase
price to become due, the payment of the purchase price
becomes a dependent and concurrent condition with
the giving of a deed and the vendor must tender a
deed as a condition to declaring a forfeiture or to
maintaining a suit for the purchase price. That rule
has been followed in many cases since that time. In
McCartney v. Campbell, 216 Cal. 715, 16 P. 2d 729,
this rule was applied and it was held that where the
vendor had still recognized the contract as in existence
after a default in making payments he had no right to
commence a quiet title action without a prior demand
of performance or a tender of a deed. In a number of
cases it has been held that where all of the installments
were past due a vendor could not maintain a quiet
title action until he had tendered a deed. Bank of
America v.Ries, 128 Cal. App. 75, 16 P. 2d 1018;
Ohanian v. Kazarian, 123 Cap. App. 196, 11 P. 2d 42;
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Caspar Lumber Co. v. Stowell, 37 Cal. App. 2d 58,
98 P. 2d 744; Ross vs.. McDougal, 31 Cal. App. 2d 114,
87 P. 2d 709."
The following cases also support the rule:
Walker lnv. Co. v. Fleming, Sup. Ct. Colo. 1926, 246
Pac. 207.
Giffen et ux. v. Faulkner, et al., Sup. Ct. Ida. 1930, 294
Pac. 521.
Klapka v. Shrauger, Sup. Ct. Neb. 1938, 281 N. \V.
612.
i\1ercer v. Federal Land Bank of Louisville, 188 S. W.
(2d) 489 300 Ky. 311.

In the case at bar there is absolutely no evidence that
the defendants ever tendered a deed to plaintiffs or that they
ever furnished an abstract of title or title insurance for examination at the time of the abortive effort to place plaintiffs in
default. Insofar as the Trial Court found to the contrary in
Findings of Fact 14, 16 and elsewhere, the said Findings are
absolutely unsuppo.rted by the evidence in the case. Clearly
Conclusion of Law No. 6 by the Court and the Decree based
thereon are absolutely contrary to law and are ·unsupported
by the Findings of Fact.
The reason for the application of the rule is particularly
apparent in this case. At the time of the conversation between
l\1r. and Mrs. White and Mr. Loveland and Mr. Abraham
Sieverts, Jr., on the telephone on August 7, 1952, reference
was made to the fact that the abstract was not brought to
date and that there was a portion of the property on which
there was no abstract of title insurance policy had been ten·
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dered. Unquestionably and explicitly, the obligation to obtain
an abstract of title insurance policy was upon the seller. The
seller cannot escape this obligation by the lame excuse that
they thought that ~~ r. Loveland was going to take care of those
matters.
The sellers here are attempting to deprive plaintiffs of
their equitable interest in real property. They must themselves
have performed their obligation before they are in any position
to complain of plaintiffs' alleged non-performance. They
themselves must have as strictly complied with the nice requirements of the law of tender as the demands they make upon
plaintiffs. Clearly the notice of July 19th contains no tender
of deeds or abstracts. Certainly defendants cannot say that
they tendered an abstract, title insurance or a warranty deed
over the telephone, particularly when it is absolutely dear
that they never executed a deed to the property to plaintiffs,
never had a title insurance policy and apparently didn't know
whether they had an abstract.
On the other hand, the evidence indicates that defendants
agreed that they would come into the office of plaintiffs to
execute the deed, to obtain the payment due, and to deliver
proper abstracts of title or insurance upon the property.
It is submitted that the action of the Trial Court in permitting defendants to hold plaintiffs in default on this contract,
when defendants themselves tendered no performance required, is inequitable, grossly unfair and is expressly contrary
to the rulings of the cases herein cited.
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POINT IV
THE CONCLUSIONS OF LAW ARE NOT SUPPORTED BY THE FINDINGS, AND THE DECREE IS NOT
SUPPORTED BY THE FINDINGS OF FACT AND/OR
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW.
As more particularly specified in the first three points of
this brief, the Findings are inadequate, incomplete and equiYocal. They do not support the Conclusions of Law and Decree,
and the Trial Court incorrectly applied the law to the facts
of the case.
The Court should determine that plaintiffs were never
in default of the oral modification of the contract; that defendants made no objection to plaintiffs' tender at the time
the contract was made, and that defendants made no valid
tender of a deed or of the provisions of the contract requiring
marketable title, an abstract of title and/or title insurance
on the property.

CONCLUSION
For all the foregoing reasons it is respectfully submittecl
that the judgment of the Trial Court should be reversed; that
a decree should be entered in accordance with the demands
of plaintiffs' complaint requiring specific performance of the
contract, and awarding to plaintiffs' attorneys fees, damages
and costs in such amount as the Court may determine.
McKAY, BURTON, McMILLAN
and RICHARDS,
Attorneys for Plaintiffs and
App!dlants
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